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NOTES
EXPLAINING THE LEGAL SYSTEM'S
INADEQUATE RESPONSE TO THE ABUSE
OF WOMEN: A LACK OF COORDINATION
I. INTRODUCTION
The battering of women has reached epidemic proportions in the
United States. Surveys indicate that between one-third and one-half of the
4,611 women murdered in the United States in 1988 were killed by a
husband, boyfriend or ex-mate.'
Unfortunately, information about the severity of such violence is
sparse, because little data has been collected on actual injuries sustained
in any particular incident. Nevertheless, one analyst has reported that
"the average severity of the injuries sustained by victims of spousal
assaults is significantly greater than those sustained by victims of assaults
by strangers." 2 More women are admitted to emergency rooms after
being battered by their partners than are treated for muggings, car
accidents, and rapes combined. 3
Violence between partners is often serious and even fatal.
Fatalities from abuse are' all too common: the batterer may kill his
victim,4 she may kill him' or one of them may commit suicide in order
1. Feeney, Getting The OP is Easy, N.Y. Daily News, Sept. 3, 1989, at 54, col.
1.
2. See Finesmith, Police Response to Battered Women: A Critique and Proposals
for Reform, 14 SETON HALL L. REv. 74, 78 n.27 (1983) (citing Gaquin, Spouse Abuse:
Data From The National Crime Survey, 2 VICTIMOLoGY: AN INT'L J. 635, 640-41
(1977-78)). This survey indicates that while only 5% of all assaults are perpetrated by
spouses or ex-spouses, these incidents account for 12% of all assaults resulting in injury,
14% of assaults requiring hospitalization, 16% of all assaults requiring medical care, and
18% of those resulting in loss of more than one day from work. Id.
3. Feeney, supra note 1.
4. Two thousand to four thousand women are killed each year as a result of family
violence. See O'Reilly, Wife Beating: The Silent Crime, TIME, Sept. 5, 1983, at 23.
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to escape an unbearable situation.6 Moreover, statistics indicate that
domestic disturbances account for a substantial portion of all crime-related
injuries and deaths of intervening police officers."
These chilling statistics, which document the plight of battered
women, reflect a traditional problem: women have been battered for
centuries' without any protection from the courts." Although public
perceptions of the battered woman and her abusive male partner have
improved, 0 misconceptions about the reality of the battering relationship
still permeate the legal system." The law's dedication to the elimination
of the problem is half-hearted and its reaction remains misguided.
5. See, e.g., Comment, Defense Strategies for Battered Women Who Assault Their
Mate: State v. Curry, 4 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 161 (1981) (according to an estimate from
Cook County, Illinois, 40% of all women incarcerated there on homicide charges were
accused of killing a man who had previously battered them).
6. See O'Reilly, supra note 4, at 24.
7. Waaland & Keeley, Police Decision Making in Wife Abuse: The Impact ofLegal
and Extralegal Factors, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 355 (1985). A 1978 article in Police
Magazine reported that 40% of all police injuries and 20% of all police deaths on duty
are the result of becoming caught in a family dispute. See The Silent Crime, supra note
4, at 24. Moreover, the nation's police spend one-third of their time responding to
domestic violence calls. Id.
8. See generally Davidson, Wife Beating: A Recurring Phenomenon Through
History, in BATTERED WOMEN: A PSYCHO-SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE 2 (M. Roy ed. 1977).
9. In 1765, a London Magistrate ruled that a man could beat his wife if he used a
stick no thicker than a man's thumb. See Calvert, Criminal and Civil Liability in
Husband-Wife Assaults, in VIOLENCE IN THE FAMILY 89 (S. Steinmetz & M. Straus eds.
1975).
10. See O'Reilly, supra note 4, at 26 (newspapers, judges, hospitals, neighbors,
even a growing number of exasperated police officers have begun to understand the
dimensions of the problem).
11. Sergeant Louis Mancuso of Manhattan's Ninth Precinct believes that there are
often extenuating circumstances which do not warrant arrest, one being that "[m]aybe
she wasn't giving him what he needed sexually." Id. at 24. The legal system is not
alone in its misunderstanding of the battering relationship. Even those non-legal
"professionals" who battered women would expect to comprehend their situation (i.e.,
doctors, social workers and psychiatrists) have frequently been less helpful than the
police and have actually perpetuated the battered syndrome, e.g., "[dioctors fail to note
signs of abuse, label battered women psychotic or hypochondriacal, prescribe
tranquilizers and tell them to go home, and 'make a women doubt her own sanity' by
sending her to a family therapist." Id. (quoting Evan Stark, research associate at Yale's
Institution for Social and Policy studies and his wife, Dr. Anne Fliteraft).
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Powerful social forces permit and even encourage abuse. 12
These forces continue to influence legal institutions and personnel, and
undermine the legal system's desire and ability to combat the problem.13
Even if these forces were purged from the legal system, they would
probably continue to operate in society at large. As long as social forces
and attitudes condone battering, the legal system alone can never provide
a complete solution to battering. Nevertheless, the law and those
responsible for enforcing it can play a critical role in reducing domestic
violence. Someone must move against abuse, and no other societal
institution has the legal system's clout to protect victims and to force
batterers to face the consequences of their transgressions.
The legal system must respond in unison. There must be
coordinated intervention among legislators, police, prosecutors and judges.
This Note will address the legal system's inadequate response to the plight
of battered women. The separate attempts of the legislature, police,
prosecutors and judiciary to confront the problem will be analyzed.
Generally, analysis will show that although attitudes maintaining the legal
system's reluctance to use its powers against batterers have improved, a
full-scale vigorous legal response has not been offered by any one of the
individual players, nor by the legal system as a whole. Finally, this Note
will suggest that only through a policy of coordination, with prosecutors
aiding judges, legislators releasing the hands of police and the discretion
of the judiciary, and with the entire legal system coming together to aid
the victim, can the problem of battered women be seriously considered
and effectively managed.
II. THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
Historically, the law has not afforded battered women much
protection from their male abusers. Until the early twentieth century, the
law explicitly permitted men to beat their wives.14 American common
law in the early nineteenth century allowed a man to chastise his wife
"[w]ithout subjecting himself to vexatious prosecutions for assault and
12. See authorities cited in Waits, The Criminal Justice System's Response to
Battering: Understanding the Problem, Forging the Solutions, 60 WASH. L. REV. 267,
269 n.9 (1985).
13. See infra notes 195-214 and accompanying text.
14. For example, a medieval theological law gives a man permission to castigate
and beat his wife. E. DAVIS, THE FIRST SEx 255 (1971). Further, a sixteenth century
Russian Household Ordinance describes the most effective way to beat one's wife. W.
MANDEL, SoviET WoMEN 12 (1975).
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battery, resulting in the shame and discredit of all parties concerned.""5
The legislative response to judicial reluctance to support the rights
of battered women was painstakingly slow. Eventually, intensified public
concern with family violence brought about legislative attempts to act. By
the latter half of the 1970's, many legislative initiatives had been
undertaken to pass legislation in aid of battered women.16 For example,
Pennsylvania enacted a law enlarging the number and scope of alternative
dispositions available to a court confronted with an abused spouse case.
17
A Massachusetts statute spelled out the duties of investigating law
enforcement officials in protecting abused spouses and expanded the
number of circumstances under which arrests could be made for offenses
committed outside a law officer's presence." The two most common
15. Eisenberg & Micklow, The Assaulted Wife: "Catch 22" Revisited, 3 WoMEN's
RTS. L. REP. 138 (1977) (citing Bradley v. State, 2 Miss. (2 Walker) 156, 158 (1824);
"repudiated as a revolting precedent" in Harris v. State, 71 Miss. 462, 464, 14 So. 266
(1894)).
16. Schecter, Coping with Family Violence Strategies and Tactics for the 1980's,
6 VT. L. REV. 325, 327-28 (1981).
17. See 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 10181-10190 (Purdon 1977). The statute
authorized the court to
grant any protective order or approve any
consent agreement to bring about a cessation of
abuse of the plaintiff or minor children, which
may include:
(1) Directing the defendant to refrain from
abusing the plaintiff or any minor children;
(2) Granting possession to the plaintiff of the
residence or household to the exclusion of the
defendant ....
Id. § 10186.
18. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, §§ 1-6 (West 1980). The statute
provided that any law officer who had reason to believe that a family or household
member had been abused
shall use all reasonable means to prevent further
abuse, including: (1) remaining on the scene as
long as there is immediate danger . . . ; (2)
assisting such person in obtaining medical
treatment . . . ; (3) giving such person
immediate and adequate notice of his or her
rights; (4) arresting any person whom the officer
has probable cause to believe has committed a
felony; (5) arresting any person who has
committed, in the officer's presence, a
misdemeanor which involves abuse; (6) arresting
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types of statutory enactments were (1) laws allowing victims to obtain
protective orders against abusers19 and (2) laws providing aid to
supportive services, such as emergency shelters for battered victims.'
As the 1970's progressed, the trend of legislative initiative moved
away from helping the abuse victim and towards imposing criminal
sanctions on the abuser. The change in legislative direction was reflected
in legislation creating new "family violence" offenses by using existing
assault laws to punish violent acts within the family.21
any person whom the officer has probable cause
to believe has committed a misdemeanor
pursuant to section thirty-four C of chapter two
hundred and eight.
Id. § 6.
19. Schecter, supra note 16.
20. Id. For a state-by-state survey of domestic violence legislation at the end of the
1970's, see Lerman & Livingston, State Legislation on Domestic Violence, RESPONSE
TO VIOLENCE IN THE FAM. & SEXUAL ASSAULT, Sept./Oct. 1981, at 1, 6-28.
21. Schecter, supra note 16, at 328-30. See, e.g., the following California statute:
Corporal injury; Infliction by spouse upon his or
her spouse or by her person cohabiting with
person of opposite sex.
(a) Any person who willfully inflicts upon his or
her spouse, or any person who willfully inflicts
upon any person of the opposite sex with whom
he or she is cohabiting, corporal injury resulting
in a traumatic condition, is guilty of a felony,
and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by
imprisonment in the state prison for 2, 3 or 4
years, or in the county jail for not more than one
year.
(b) Holding oneself out to be the husband or wife
of the person with whom one is cohabiting is not
necessary to constitute cohabitation as the term
is used in this section.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 273.5 (West Supp. 1982). Another example of such legislation can
be seen in the following Washington statute:
PURPOSE - Intent
The purpose of this chapter is to recognize the
importance of domestic violence legislation as a
serious crime against society and to assure the
victim of domestic violence the maximum
protection from the abuse which the law and
those who enforce the law can provide. The
legislature finds that the existing criminal statutes
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Although the 1970's witnessed an emergence of new legislative
initiatives in the area of wife-battery, important proposals were rejected
in many states and on the federal level.' Much of the legislation
designed to protect battered wives did not provide adequate funding or
resources to accomplish the objectives of the draftsmen.' Police and
state officials undermined the effectiveness of legislation by failing to
vigorously implement the statutes.' As recently as 1978, only nine
states had legislation which dealt seriously with domestic violence,
although several other states had begun to make provision for shelter
homes for battered women.'
In response to this legislative rejection, advocates for battered
women worked to create a legal system responsive to the needs of the
abused. Indeed, most of the domestic abuse laws have been enacted
largely as a result of the work of legal services attorneys and the staffs of
are adequate to provide protection for victims of
domestic violence. However, previous societal
attitudes have been reflected in policies and
practices of law enforcement agencies and
prosecutors which have resulted in differing
treatment of crimes occurring between
cohabitants and of the same crimes occurring
between strangers. Only recently has public
perception of the serious consequences of
domestic violence to society and to the victims
led to the recognition of the necessity for early
intervention by law enforcement agencies. It is
the intent of the legislature that the official
response to cases of domestic violence shall
stress the enforcement of the laws and shall
communicate the attitude that violent behavior is
not excused or tolerated. Furthermore, it is the
intent of the legislature that criminal laws be
enforced without regard to whether the persons
involved are or were married, cohabiting, or
involved in a relationship.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.99.010 (1980).
22. Schecter, supra note 16, at 330.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. The Progress Of State Domestic Violence Legislation, 4 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA)
No. 5, at 4027 (July 25, 1978) (study presents domestic violence laws, whether pending
or enacted in 50 states).
1990] NOTES 155
battered women's shelters. As a result, many states have passed
extensive legislation to provide early intervention in domestic abuse
cases2" and to reform existing domestic violence laws.'
A summary of the New York Legislature's attempt to grapple
with the plight of battered women provides insight into an individual state
legislature's response. In 1962, the New York State Legislature adopted
the Family Court Act,' "intending to provide practical help" to abusers
rather than punish them by means of criminal prosecution.' By the
mid-1970's, however, it became obvious that the New York Legislature's
response was grossly inadequate:3' men still attacked and beat their
wives or lovers, and the government was simply not providing women
26. Schecter, supra note 16, at 327. The New York City Bar, with the help of the
Victim Services Agency, has recently taken an important step towards alleviating the
problem of too few lawyers for the growing number of battered women seeking help by
initiating a pilot program in Bronx and Manhattan Family Courts called the Family Court
Summer Assistance Project For Battered Women. Nance, 22 Summer Associates Assist
Battered Women in the Bronx, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 1, 1990, at 2, col. 1.
27. See Lerman, A Model States Act, Remedies for Domestic Abuse, 21 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 61 (1984). This article presents a model act which consolidates and addresses
remedies needed for domestic violence into one comprehensive statute. It asserts that
the primary goal of any law on domestic violence should be to protect the victim. Id.
Accordingly, the Model Act facilitates the victim's ability to gain access to the courts
and to request protection. Id. The Model Act also acknowledges the need for improved
police response to domestic violence and specifies particular police duties. Id. Finally,
the Model Act considers the appropriate treatment of abusers and includes both punitive
and rehabilitative dispositional options. Id.; see also Note, Montana's New Domestic
Abuse Statute: A New Response to an Old Problem, 47 MONT. L. REV. 403 (1986)
[hereinafter Note, Montana's New Domestic Abuse Statute]; see generally Note,
Domestic Relations: Legal Responses to Wife Beating: Theory and Practice in Ohio, 16
AKRON L. REV. 731 (1983) [hereinafter Note, Domestic Relations].
28. See Lerman, supra note 27, at 63.
29. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 111 (McKinney 1963). For an excellent analysis of the
New York Family Court Act from its inception, see Note, Jurisdiction Over Family
Offenses in New York: A Reconsideration of the Provisions for Choice of Forum, 31
SYRACUSE L. REV. 601 (1980).
30. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT art. 8 commentary at 125 (McKinney 1983). There was
a general consensus in 1962, when the Family Court Act was drafted, that treatment, not
prosecution, was the best societal response to family violence. Id.
31. id. Regardless of the good intentions to deal with the problem of domestic
violence from a sociological standpoint, the fact is that existing procedures were not
protecting women. Women were still being beaten and even killed. See Bruno v. Codd,
47 N.Y.2d 582, 393 N.E.2d 976, 419 N.Y.S.2d 901 (1979).
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with adequate protection.32
An important reform in New York33 was the legislature's
amendment of the Family Court Act in 1977. The legislature realized
that protecting family members and putting an end to domestic violence
were primary goals which must be met before the use of remedial tools
such as counseling and reconciliation.3" This amendment produced two
important weapons for fighting domestic violence: (1) victims were given
their choice of forums' and (2) the Family Court's power to issue
"protective orders" was greatly strengthened.37
Prior to September 1, 1977, the filing of a petition in family court
pursuant to article 8 of the Family Court Act was the only way to initiate
a family offense proceeding.3" In 1977, the New York Legislature
enacted new legislation in order to provide the battered spouse with more
effective relief.39 This "enabling" statute allowed the battered woman
to commence a family court proceeding by filing a petition in family
court& or to commence a criminal action by filing an accusatory
instrument in a criminal court41 for any act that was designated a family
offense in § 812 of the Family Court Act.42 Initially, it became apparent
that electing family court under the choice-of-forum provision effectively
barred a subsequent proceeding in the alternative criminal court forum.
The legislature responded to this pitfall in the application of the statute
through enactment of a 1978 amendment which permitted a battered
spouse to change forums within seventy-two hours of the filing of an
32. One case, Bruno v. Codd, 90 Misc. 2d 1047, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974 (Sup. Ct.
1977), presents lucid evidence of the continued existence of domestic violence. See infra
notes 90-94 and accompanying text.
33. See Note, Sorichetti v. City of New York Tells the Police that Liability Looms
for Failure to Respond to Domestic Violence Situations, 40 U. MIAMI L. REv. 333
(1985) [hereinafter Note, Sorichetti].
34. 1977 N.Y. Laws 449.
35. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT art. 8 commentary at 125 (McKinney 1983)
(emphasizing that the legislature's first priority is to protect family members by ending
the violence).
36. 1977 N.Y. Laws 449.
37. See N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT art. 8 commentary at 128 (McKinney 1983).
Protective orders are discussed infra notes 44-67 and accompanying text.
38. N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 821 (McKinney 1975).
39. 1977 N.Y. Laws 449.
40. Id. §§ 1, 3.
41. Id. §§ 1, 3, 10.
42. Id.
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accusatory instrument or a family court petition. ' By granting a choice
of forum, the legislature attempted to ensure better access to the courts for
battered women.
The 1977 amendments also strengthened the family court's power
to issue protective orders." Protection orders "are court-issued
temporary or permanent orders which direct an assailant to refrain from
further abusive conduct."45 More importantly, especially in the eyes of
battered women, a certificate setting forth the terms of the order of
protection, when presented to a peace officer, authorized the officer to
take into custody a person charged with violating the order.' Through
this "remedial and protective tool," the legislature saw the opportunity to
directly confront the problem of spousal abuse.47 Such an order may
require the petitioner or the respondent:
(a) to stay away from the home, the other spouse or the
child;
(b) to permit a parent to visit the child at stated periods;
(c) to abstain from offensive conduct against the child or
against any person to whom custody of the child is
awarded;
(d) to give proper attention to the care of the home;
(e) to refrain from acts of commission or omission that
43. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 100.07 (McKinney Supp. 1979); N.Y. FAM. CT.
ACT §§ 812(2)(e), 821(2), 821(3)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1979).
44. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT. art. 8 commentary at 128 (McKinney 1983). This
SECTION specifically focuses on legislatively enacted civil remedies available to
battered women. A discussion of the criminal remedies available through state or
municipally instigated action was better suited for analysis within the discussion in
SECTION VIA, infra text accompanying notes 158-94, because criminal legislation is
an area in which the legislature can act in unison with the police, i.e., mandatory arrest
statutes to fight abusers. The analysis of the problems with civil protection orders and
the possible solutions should convey the message to the reader that although the
legislature has made an effort, it has not yet decided to completely solve the problem.
45. In the context of family violence, protection orders are so defined. Note,
Restraining Order Legislation for Battered Women: A Reassessment, 16 U.S.F. L. REV.
703 (1982) [hereinafter Note, Restraining Order].
46. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 168 (McKinney 1983).
47. Note, Sorichetti, supra note 33, at 342. The legislature viewed the protective
order as an indication to the abuser that the courts have deemed it necessary to provide
the holder of the order with the needed protection. Id. (citing N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT. art.
8 commentary at 128 (McKinney 1983)). By creating such an impression on the abuser,
the courts hoped that the protective order would prevent further assaults. Id.
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tend to make the home not a proper place for the
child.45
Orders of protection, however, have not lived up to the New York
Legislature's expectations. Presently, access to orders of protection can
be an unnavigable obstacle course for domestic violence victims. 9
In February 1988, Justices Milton L. Williams, Deputy
Administrative Judge for New York City, and Robert Keating, New York
City Criminal Court Administrative Judge, initiated a task force to
investigate the problems of the city's summons court which handles the
tens of thousands domestic violence cases and requests for orders of
protection.' In June 1989, the investigating committee, comprised of
thirteen judges, lawyers and crime experts, released its findings in the
Report of The Task Force On The Civilian Initiated Complaint System in
the New York City Criminal Court. 1 The Task Force Report found that
the civil-initiated complaint system created by the legislature poorly
served domestic violence victims.52 According to the Task Force
Report, "the byzantine nature of the present [New York City] civilian-
initiated complaint process makes it difficult for at-risk persons to obtain
48. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 842 (McKinney 1988). The order generally requires a
defendant to stay away from a person or premise, or to refrain from verbal or physical
abuse. Feeney, Orders of Illusion, N.Y. Daily News, Sept. 3, 1989, at 54, col. 1. If
the person named on the order is proven to have violated the instructions, he is guilty
of contempt. id. Tenants, landlords, merchants and social service workers all avail
themselves of "OP's," but the vast majority of the more than 40,000 active protective
orders in New York City are held by women seeking to protect themselves from men.
Id. In 1989, 8,000 women in the Bronx filed family offense petitions seeking orders of
protection according to Laurie Milder, Director of the Community Outreach Law
Program at the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. See Nance, supra note
26.
49. This discussion of the shortcomings of orders of protection deals with the
difficulties in actually obtaining the certificate. An analysis of whether the order of
protection means anything to those required to enforce it is undertaken in SECTION 11I,
infra text accompanying notes 68-108.
50. Feeney, The Court of Blunders, N.Y. Daily News, Sept. 4, 1989, at 16, col.
2.
51. NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON PROCESSING CIVILIAN COMPLAINT SYSTEM
BY THE NEW YORK CITY CRIMINAL COURT, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON THE
CIVILIAN-INrrIATED COMPLAINT PROCESS IN THE NEW YORK CITY CRIMINAL COURT
(1989) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE].
52. Id. at 35.
[Vol. VIII
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even an order of protection in a timely fashion."53 The Task Force
Report concluded that only the most determined victims were likely to
pursue their quest for an order of protection and "many complainants with
legitimate grievances find the system too onerous."5'
Statutorily required relationships have also proven to be a major
hindrance to court access for abused women seeking orders of
protection.55 Montana's former order of protection statute made relief
available only to abused spouses.' There was also a limitation
excluding former spouses. 7  This marriage requirement has little
correlation with the type of person who will seek assistance, because
spouses are not the only victims of women beating. 8  Moreover,
incidents of women beating commonly occur among former spouses."
Thus, unmarried or divorced women in Montana who were victims of
domestic violence could not petition for an order of protection.' In
1985, the Montana Legislature specifically changed the law to increase the
availability of domestic abuse orders of protection. 6' Some states now
53. Id.
The existing process is marked by slow
starts and false hopes and expectations.... A
persistent, vituperative applicant with a petty
claim should not have the right to see a judge
and prosecute his or her claim while a fearful
victim of domestic violence is unable to obtain
redress because of the complexity of the process
and the lack of a supportive setting.
id. at 47.
54. Id. at 35. The report further stated that "no one is available to explain the
possible consequences of their decision. Nor is anyone available . .. to provide
emotional support, practical assistance, or a referral to a shelter should they decide that
they cannot go home." Id.
55. See Note, Montana's New Domestic Abuse Statute, supra note 27.
56. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-106(1), (3) (1983).
57. Id.
58. Gaquin, Spouse Abuse: Data from the National Crime Survey, 2 VICTIMOLOGY:
AN INT'L J. 635, 635 (1977-78).
59. Id.
60. The order of protection statute provided the sole civil remedy available to
domestic abuse victims. Note, Montana's New Domestic Abuse Statute, supra note 27,
at 413 n.95.
61. The relationship between the victim and the abuser must be that of a "family
or household member." MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-121(3)(a) (1985). Under the new
law "persons who may request relief ... include spouses, former spouses and persons
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have a household requirement that demands that the "participants in the
battering relationship" occupy the same home.' This ignores the reality
that some couples have longstanding relationships and/or children but have
never lived together.' These arbitrary restrictions, to the extent that
they deny relief to otherwise qualified persons, frustrate the goal of
providing an alternative civil remedy for battered women.
Civil orders of protection are the most widely used remedy for
wife beating.' Battered women prefer obtaining an order of protection
to initiating a criminal prosecution.' Numerous studies indicate,
however, that these orders are not effective in stopping the battering of
women.' The fact remains that "Orders of Protection are only worth
the paper they are written on."67 Existing civil protection order
legislation must be improved by increasing access and improving
procedures. Finally, the legislature must take heed of the plight of the
battered woman. The question remains, however, whether the
legislatures' efforts have been supported by the other arms of the legal
system.
III. THE POLICE RESPONSE
As society's peacekeepers, law enforcement personnel are in a
position to help battered women." Police involvement in domestic
disturbances exceeds their combined involvement in murder, rape, and all
cohabiting or who have cohabited with the other party within one year immediately
preceding the filing of the petition." See id. § 40-4-121(3)(b).
62. Note, Restraining Order, supra note 45, at 707.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 740.
65. Id.
66. Id. Twenty-year-old Erica Due of Nassau County was stabbed and strangled
by her husband, James Due, on July 27, 1989, while under the protection of her third
court order, issued July 3, 1989. Fecney, Sentenced To Death?, N.Y. Daily News,
Sept. 3, 1989, at 54, col. 3. Authorities said she had received two temporary orders
following assaults by her husband on September 8 and November 8, but failed to attend
hearings to get them extended. Id. She was killed three hours before she was to testify
about the most recent assault charge before Nassau District Court Judge Mark Mogel.
Id.
67. E. Yaroshefsky, Private Practitioner, Remarks at a Panel Discussion on Battered
Women, presented by the Legal Association for Women at New York Law School (Nov.
13, 1989).
68. See, e.g., Waaland & Keeley, supra note 7.
NOTES
other forms of aggravated assault.' Police policy toward battered
women assumes many forms, varying from outright refusal to arrest
batterers and recognize domestic violence as a criminal matter,' to a
practice of giving domestic violence calls lower priority than non-domestic
disputes.71 This is logical considering that official police policy has
often stressed avoidance of arrest whenever possible."r Sometimes
police policy is explained in written manuals' and other times it is
demonstrated by a pattern of police behavior that treats assaults by men
against their wives less seriously than assaults by strangers.74
Despite the belief and preference of some people that police
respond to the crime of wife battering by enforcing the law against the
wife batterer, 5 the policy of many jurisdictions is to encourage non-
arrest or mediation by police officers.76 In one survey it was found that
less than twenty-five percent of the jurisdictions examined required the
full enforcement of the law and the arrest of the wife batterer.' The
results of this survey show that police policy was a clear reflection of
69. Id.
70. Eppler, Battered Women and the Equal Protection Clause: Will the Constitution
Help Them When the Police Won't, 95 YALE L.J. 788, 788-89 nn.3-4 (1986).
71. Id. at 794 n.13.
72. See generally Pence, The Duluth Domestic Abuse Intervention Project, 6
HAMLINE L. REv. 247, 248 n.1 (1983) (author presents various authorities supporting
this position).
73. Eppler, supra note 70, at 790. An example of a typical police manual is the
Madison, Wisconsin Police Department Newsletter which indicates that appropriate
police responses to domestic violence cases may range from mediation of the dispute to
referral to counseling agencies, and finally, to arrest. F. REMINGTON, D. NEWMAN, F.
KIMBALL, H. GOLDSTEIN & W. DICKEY, CRIMINAL JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION CASES
AND MATERIALS ch. 3 (rev. ed. 1982) (citing MADISON, WIS. POLICE DEP'T
NEWSLETTER (Sept. 26, 1978)). Many police manuals base their guidelines on the
Model Rules For Law Enforcement Officers Developed by the International Association
of Chiefs of Police. INTERNATIONAL ASs'N OF CHIEFS OF POLICE, MODEL RULES FOR
LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS: A MANUAL ON POLICE DISCRETION, TRAINING KEY No.
16, HANDLING DISTURBANCE CALLS (1974).
74. Eppler, supra note 70, at 790.
75. See Finesmith, supra note 2, at 75.
76. id.
77. Id. Those jurisdictions identified in the Finesmith survey as requiring the full
enforcement of the law and the arrest of the wife batterer are: Barstow, Los Angeles,
and San Francisco, Cal.; Atlanta, Ga.; Normal, Ill.; Detroit, Mich.; Dayton, Ohio;
Seattle and Spokane, Wash. Id. at 94 n.135. This policy is generally expressed in
police regulations. Id. at 92-94.
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either strong or weak state laws in the jurisdictions examined.7"
Recent history sheds an unfavorable light on the police response
to domestic violence. During the 1950's and 1960's the police response
could best be classified as one of passive reluctance to help the victim.7'
For example, the police in Detroit, Michigan, during the 1950's often
refused to take action when confronted with domestic disputes and when
they did arrest it was usually followed by a referral to a misdemeanor
complaint bureau which did no more than to release the abuser on an
informal, unenforceable bond.' Similarly, in Chicago in the early
1960's, the primary police responses were ad hoc informal attempts at
conflict resolution by police responding to calls for help."'
The justifications for police non-enforcement policies in wife
abuse cases are numerous. The many rationalizations include preserving
the traditional principle that "a man's home is his castle,"' avoiding
arrest in situations in which the physical abuse of a woman by her
husband is purported to be acceptable within the couple's culture," and
maintaining the efficient and economic administration of the state's law
enforcement agencies by regarding wife battering as a minor crime and
the arrest of wife batterers as a low priority." Other rationalizations
have been: avoiding arrest in situations in which the family could ill
afford the economic impact of the husband's arrest (e.g., time lost from
work)" and respecting a couple's privacy by not interfering in private
marital matters.' Regardless of the specific rationalization, none of
78. Id. at 94 n.135.
79. Id. at 84-85.
80. Id. at 84.
81. Id. at 84-85.
82. See Marcus, Conjugal Violence: The Law of Force and The Force of Law, 69
CALIF. L. REV. 1657, 1660 (1981); Parnas, The Police Response to the Domestic
Disturbance, 4 Wis. L. REV. 914, 931 (1967).
83. Parnas, supra note 82, at 930 (the couple's culture refers to their joint
subscription to traditional opinions about male and female roles).
84. See, e.g., Note, The Case for Legal Remedies for Abused Women, 6 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & Soc. CHANoE 135 (1977) [hereinafter Note, Case for Legal Remedies].
85. See Marcus, supra note 82, at 1670; Parnas, supra note 82, at 930.
86. See Note, Case For Legal Remedies, supra note 84, at 169; Marcus, supra note
82. Further attempts at justification include preventing the possibly severe retaliation
against the battered wife by the arrested husband after release and preserving the
marriage and family which could be endangered by the intervention of the criminal
justice process. See Finesmith, supra note 2, at 85-86. The assailant may choose to
exploit the protection of the right of privacy by claiming that (1) he is the head of the
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these policies can accomplish the broad reach of arresting the batterer.
Arrest is the linchpin of an effective police response because it
communicates to the battered woman that the legal system does not blame
her for the abuse inflicted and that she will not have to tolerate it.7
Arrest conveys a similar message to the batterer. It signifies that society
condemns his conduct and will hold him accountable for it. 8 Moreover,
even if an arrest does not lead to a conviction, it is the most effective way
for police to protect women from further abuse.'
The police response to the plight of the battered women has
markedly improved as a result of several cases imposing liability on the
police because of inadequate protection given to battered women who
were eventually murdered by their abusive husbands. In Bruno v.
Codd, ° twelve battered wives in New York City, suing on behalf of
themselves and all other battered wives similarly situated, challenged the
non-arrest policies of the New York City Police Department.91 The state
supreme court held that "the police owe a duty of protection to battered
wives"' and that they are "not to automatically decline to make an arrest
simply because the assaulter and his victims are married to each other."I
The parties subsequently entered into a consent decree which required,
inter alia, that if the police had probable cause that an abuser had
committed a felony or violated a protection order, they must arrest the
household and can claim the right of privacy for all its members, regardless of their
wishes and (2) that there are competing interests involved and his right to privacy is
superior to his spouse's request for protection. Marcus, supra note 82. In response,
victims in interspousal assault cases seek legal intervention, the antithesis of privacy.
Id. Moreover, effective intervention necessarily mandates disclosure of the misconduct
that has occurred. Id.
87. See Finesmith, supra note 2, at 109.
88. Id. at 104-05 (abusers are likely to see themselves as law-abiding citizens unless
they are arrested). But see generally Steinman, Lowering Recidivism Among Men Who
Batter Women, 17 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 124 (1990) (study finding that men with
criminal records reoffended and arrest coordinated with other sanctions increased abuse
among offenders whose victims called for police help).
89. Eppler, supra note 70, at 791. There is preliminary evidence that post-arrest
counseling for a non-incarcerated batterer reduces recidivism. See Lerman, Criminal
Prosecution of Wife Beaters, RESPONSE TO VIOLENCE IN THE FAMILY, Jan./Feb. 1981,
at 1, 12. The necessity of mandatory arrest guidelines for police departments is further
discussed in SECTION VIA, infra notes 158-72 and accompanying text.
90. 90 Misc. 2d 1047, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1050, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 977.
93. Id. at 1049, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 976.
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abuser, and further, that officers must provide justification for refraining
from making an arrest when they had probable cause to believe that an
abuser had committed a misdemeanor against his spouse.'
Citing Bruno, a Connecticut District Court in Thurman v. City of
Torrington,9 held that similar police inaction was a denial of the equal
protection of the laws.' In Thurman, the plaintiff Tracy Thurman filed
a complaint which alleged a § 1983' civil rights violation of her
constitutional rights resulting from the nonperformance or malperformance
of duties by a series of official defendants." 8 These defendants included
the police of the City of Torrington and the City of Torrington itself. The
plaintiff's essential premise was that the Torrington police violated her
right to equal protection in that they rendered less attention or protection
to battered women domestic violence victims than to anonymous non-
related battery victims.' The court denied the defendants' motion to
dismiss." At trial, a jury awarded Tracy Thurman $2.3 million in
damages against the individual police officers, to compensate her for the
brutal stabbing that resulted from the police's reported refusal to arrest
her menacing husband. 11
New York City, however, needed an extra boost to supplement
Bruno. The New York City Police Department was forced to drastically
change its arrest procedures in 1984 after Josephine Sorichetti won a $2
million damage award against the city for its failure protect her from her
menacing husband. " Despite the issuance of a protective order to
Josephine Sorichetti, her numerous pleas to have her husband arrested for
death threats to her and her daughter Dina, and the extensive police
knowledge of her husband's violent behavior, the police had refused to
94. Finesmith, supra note 2, at 86.
95. 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984).
96. Id. at 1528.
97. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
98. Thurman, 595 F. Supp. at 1524.
99. Id. at 1526-27.
100. Id. at 1529.
101. Id. The parties later settled for $1.9 million. See Eppler, supra note 70, at
795 n.31.




take any action. " Frank Sorichetti was eventually convicted of
attempted murder of Josephine Sorichetti's daughter."t° Although the
majority of the damages were awarded in the civil suit to Josephine
Sorichetti's daughter for the police department's breach of its duty to
provide her with reasonable protection, 1  the court stated in no
uncertain language that a protective order was a "court given shield to
[potential] victims."1 "
These three cases indicate that courts are willing to impose on the
police a duty to take a substantially greater role in preventing domestic
violence. Are the police, however, willing to take up the mantle, or do
they need to be pushed further?
The police response has markedly improved. By 1985, the New
York City Police Department had adopted patrol guidelines which
mandated arrest in all felony assaults and in all misdemeanors when a
crime is committed in front of a police officer."°7 By March 1988, the
New York City Police Department had updated the procedures for family
offenses and domestic violence to reflect the current legal guidelines and
department policy. 'I
The legal system, however, cannot rely completely on the police
to use their discretion wisely in battering cases. Support from the other
arms of the legal system is unquestionably needed to insure an effective
police response.
103. Sorichetti v. City of New York, 65 N.Y.2d 461, 466,482 N.E.2d 70, 73, 492
N.Y.S.2d 591, 594 (1985). Frank Sorichetti threatened to kill his wife and told her that
she would be making "the sign of the cross" before the weekend was over; he told Dina
that she had better make the "sign of the cross" too. Id. To Josephine this statement
meant he intended to kill Dina as well. Id. In January 1975, Frank attacked and
punched Josephine in the chest so forcefully that he sent her "flying across the room."
Id. at 464, 482 N.E.2d at 74, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 593. In July 1975, Frank attacked her
with a butcher knife, cutting her hand and also threatened to kill both her and her
children. Id. at 464, 482 N.E.2d at 74, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 595.
104. id.
105. Id. at 465, 482 N.E.2d at 71, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 593.
106. Id. at 469-70, 482 N.E.2d at 75-76, 492 N.Y.S.2d at 596-97.
107. See Greer, City Police Have Changed Their Approach to Family Disputes,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1985, at B5, col. 3.
108. See REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE, supra note 51, at app. F ("New York City
Police Department Interim Operation Order # 17").
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IV. THE PROSECUTORIAL RESPONSE
The police can only activate the legal process. In order to
interrupt the cycle of violence permanently, prosecutors must intervene in
the battering relationship and use their power to stop abuse. Like the
police, prosecutors have erred in their historical reactions to abuse.
Prosecutors have often viewed women's abuse complaints as extralegal
family matters which have no place in the judicial system."° They have
argued that the heavy penalty and high bail for such crimes, in light of the
domestic relationship, increases the chance that either the man will contest
the charges, or the woman will drop the charges, with the result often
being no conviction."' Prosecutors have developed various diversion
techniques to avoid prosecuting women abuse cases. District attorneys are
known to have flatly refused cases of battered women without any
consideration of the particular facts,"' and frequently, after taking the
case for evaluation, they refuse to prosecute for spurious reasons" 2 or
to simply avoid aggravating the situation."'
The prosecutorial response has been ineffective for the same
reasons that the judicial response"4 has failed: both legal arms have
neglected to treat women abuse seriously enough. Prosecutors, like police
officers, are reluctant to pursue a criminal charge against a man who has
abused his wife or woman friend, even when there has been an arrest."'
A lack of perseverance has been common. For example, Denise
Markham, lawyer and supervisor for the Domestic Violence Advocacy
109. Note, Case for Legal Remedies, supra note 84, at 149 (prosecutors express
concern that prosecuting a man will take away a woman's support and force her onto
welfare).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 149 n.97 (citing Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Class
Certification and Preliminary Injunction at 2, and Complaint for Declaratory and
Injunctive Relief at 2, Raquez v. Chandler, (No. C74-1064) (N.D. Ohio, filed Feb. 4,
1975)).
112. Id. at 149 (for example, prosecutors tell battered women that they cannot
prosecute because prosecutors are not permitted to get involved in domestic matters).
113. See Trunninger, Marital Violence: The Legal Solutions, 23 HASTINGs L.J. 259,
273 (1971). District attorneys' offices have also been criticized for minimizing the
seriousness of the husband's acts during its conciliation efforts. Id. "One client of
Legal Service attorneys described the process as her husband being told that beating his
wife was a no-no." Id.
114. See infra notes 130-57 and accompanying text.
115. Note, Case for Legal Remedies, supra note 84, at 149.
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Project in Chicago, estimates that about 90% of the domestic violence
cases in Cook County, Illinois, are charged as misdemeanors, no matter
how severe the injuries.
116
A troubling issue for prosecutors which may deserve some of the
blame for the reluctant prosecutorial attitude towards wife abuse is the
manner in which to proceed when a battered woman is either reluctant to
press charges117 or wants to drop charges in a pending matter.11
Estimates of domestic violence victims who drop charges or refuse to
cooperate with prosecutors can be staggering. In New York City these
estimates range from 50% to 80%.9 The reasons for the abundance
of dropped complaints vary. Frequently, the charges are dropped by the
battered woman because she is "sweet-talked" into dropping her complaint
or because of threats made to herself or her children.t2°
Prosecutorial response to the "dropped complaint" problem is
evidence that prosecutors have allowed the victim to be the leader of
prosecutorial efforts, instead of a mere witness whose participation the
state must support and encourage. It should be made clear that the
prosecutor, not the victim, is responsible for enforcing the law. 1' When
prosecutors deal seriously with abuse and convince the batterer that the
former "mean business" the batterer will often plead guilty."
One solution that has been presented by prosecutors' offices is
adoption of "no-drop" policies in abuse cases. Where such policies exist,
the prosecutors will decline to drop charges merely on the victim's
116. Blodgett, Violence in the Home, 73 A.B.A. J. 66, 68 (1987). Rep. Lois
Hagerty, R. Montgomery County (Pa.), a former Assistant District Attorney in
Montgomery County, stated that "[niothing about the cases was treated seriously." Id.
117. Eppler, supra note 70, at 808 n.82.
118. Id.
119. Feeney, When There Is No Justice, N.Y. Daily News, Sept. 4, 1989, at 16,
col. 4. Mary Haviland, Director of the Coalition for Criminal Justice Reform for
Battered Women, estimates that less than ten domestic violence cases a year in New
York City actually go to trial. Id. at 17, col. 1. "Misdemeanors almost never go to
trial," Haviland said, "and defense attorneys are only too happy to call a prosecutor's
bluff." Id.
120. Id. at 16, col. 4. April La Salata's husband, Anthony, defied several orders
of protection. Id. She delayed divorcing him and wavered in her perseverance because
he threatened to kill her mother. Id. He later stabbed her and finally succeeded in
killing her with a shotgun blast in her own driveway. Id.
121. Note, Domestic Relations, supra note 27, at 734.
122. O'Reilly, supra note 4, at 26.
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request. 1 The basic theory behind no-drop policies is sound, since it
constitutes a strong statement of societal responsibility for deterring
batterers. Additionally, such policies rob the abuser of much of his
coercive power against the victim." However, except in cases of
severe violence or recidivism, battered women should not be further
victimized by being held in contempt if they remain staunch in their
unwillingness to testify."z
Another suggestion has focused on the prosecutor's understanding
of the victim's concerns and his setting goals for prosecution which
correspond to these concerns.'2 For example, the prospect of a stiff
fine or incarceration may dissuade a battered woman from continuing with
prosecution if she has young children and no means of support.127 This
theory reasons that when prosecutors tailor their strategies to relief
battered women desire from the criminal justice system, both victims and
prosecutors will benefit. 2 s
The creation of any special relationship cannot excuse a lack of
prosecutorial initiative. When a victim is able to reach her decisions
freely, this "concern-tailored" approach can be useful. However, when
the accused has great emotional and physical influence over the victim,
the state must intercede forcefully on behalf of the victim. There must be
a commitment by prosecutors to assume responsibility for the prosecution
of woman abuse. This commitment must be translated into concrete
policies that are carried out. Prosecutors' offices must make pursuit of
battery cases a priority, and must have trained staff who are experts in
dealing with the problem.
Whatever the solution, it will only materialize when prosecutors
accept the serious criminal nature of woman abuse and conclude that the
123. See L. LERMAN, PROSECUTION OF SPOUSE ABUSE: INNOVATIONS IN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE RESPONSE 64 (1981).
124. A good example of a "no-drop" policy is the position taken by Ohio
prosecutors who view the state, not the battered woman, as the plaintiff, and who refuse
to drop the charge at the request of the complainant. Note, Domestic Relations, supra
note 27, at 735.
125. See Riley, Spouse Abuse Victim Jailed after No-Drop Policy Invoked, Nat'l
L.J., Aug. 22, 1983, at 4, col. 3.
126. Note, Domestic Relations, supra note 27, at 734.
127. Id. at 736. A woman who wants the abuse ended but does not want to end her
relationship with the defendant, may want to impress upon the defendant that his conduct
is criminal and could result in a stiff penalty. Id.
128. Id. at 735.
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state has a duty to prosecute wife beating cases, not to dismiss them."
V. THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE
Until quite recently the role of judges in domestic violence cases
has received scant public attention. Despite marked progress over the last
decade in changing police department policies to protect battered women,
judicial attitudes and courtroom practices have for the most part lagged
behind."' This discrepancy may result in part from the impact of
public attention on police policies while judges are relatively removed
from public scrutiny." The paucity of the judicial response to the
plight of battered women is derived mostly from judicial misconceptions
about the nature of woman abuse." Judges are subject to the same
myths about domestic violence as are members of the general public. 33
The results that are disappointing. For example, many judges believe that
battered women are masochists or that they exaggerate the seriousness of
129. In support of prosecutors, it must be noted that they frequently handle 150 to
200 cases at a time (in larger cities) and regardless of how conscientious they may be,
some cases are going to fall by the wayside. Feeney, supra note 119, at 16. There are
simply not enough people and resources in large urban centers like New York City to
handle the enormity of women seeking legal relief. id. Prosecutors have attempted to
improve the prosecutorial response. See MARYLAND STATE ATTORNEY'S OFFICE,
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE POLICIES AND PROCEDURES (1989) (the Maryland State Attorney's
Office has created guidelines stressing vigorous prosecution of domestic violence cases
as crimes against the community).
130. See generally Note, Recent Developments: Judging Domestic Violence, 10
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 278 (1987) [hereinafter Note, Recent Developments].
. 131. Id. A shocking example of judicial insensitivity was displayed by Somerville,
Mass., District Court Judge Paul Heffernan in 1986 when he scolded Pamela Nigro
Dunn for seeking judicial intervention and for wasting his time in court. McNamara,
'No Quick Fix' in Abuse Case, Judge Rules, Boston Globe, Nov. 13, 1986, at 1, col. 1.
Judge Heffernan told Paul Dunn, her husband, "[y]ou want to gnaw on her and she on
you fine, but let's not do it at the taxpayer's expense." Id. at 13, col. 1. Although
Judge Heffernan granted Pamela Nigro Dunn a protection order, he denied her request
for increased protection. Id. Paul Dunn later kidnapped, shot, stabbed and strangled
his wife, and then left her body in the town dump. McNamara, Judge Criticized after
Woman's Death, Boston Globe, Sept. 21, 1986, at 1, col. 1.
132. See generally Note, Recent Developments, supra note 130.
133. Id. at 279. For a description of these myths, see Gookasian, Confronting
Domestic Violence: A Guide For Criminal Justice Agencies, in NATIONAL INST. OF
JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE ANNUAL REPORT 2-4 (1986).
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the violence they suffer to punish "philandering husbands or
boyfriends."'' Other judges adhere to "family privacy" myths, one
going so far as to chide a battery victim for washing her "dirty linen in
public."135
It is not uncommon for a woman who has overcome the complex
procedures of family court to face a judge who may be predisposed
against the use of the courts in family disputes. " Many judges feel that
woman abuse court processes are an unfair weapon in a family
quarrel.' Judges often inquire into victim provocation and abuser
excuses and may consider both as mitigating factors. Even if the batterer
is convicted, the penalty may be nothing more than a stern lecture from
the judge, perhaps ending with the extraction of a promise that the abuser
will not hurt his wife again."' Judges routinely allow first offenders
and even repeaters to be freed on low or no bail.' "Judges don't
usually do anything the first time a man violates an order of
protection." " The reluctance of judges to sentence batterers to jail can
often have tragic consequences. 4 '
The judicial response, however, has not always been negative.
Two New York cases, more than twenty years apart, depict a judiciary
that was willing to contribute once the battering relationship reached the
courtroom. In Baker v. City of New York, 42 a husband shot his
134. See U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, UNDER THE RULE OF THUMB:
BATTERED WOMEN AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 12, 91 (1982) [hereinafter
RULE OF THUMB].
135. Id. at 56-57.
136. Note, Case for Legal Remedies, supra note 84, at 155.
137. Id. at 155 n.139.
138. Parnas, Judicial Response to Intra-Family Violence, 54 MINN. L. REV. 585,
598-99 (1970).
139. Feeney, Orders Of Illusion, N.Y. Daily News, Sept. 3, 1989, at 54, col. 1.
Judges in New York City too frequently declare assaults and violations "adjourned in
contemplation of dismissal," which is the equivalent of a court finding the defendant not
guilty of any of the alleged conduct. Id. If the defendant obeys the orders of the judge
for a period of time (up to six months) the case is dismissed and the defendant's record
is expunged. Id. Therefore, if the defendant is brought before the bench again, no one
knows that he has a history of violence. Id.
140. Blodgett, supra note 116, at 69. According to Barbara Hart, a founder of the
Washington, D.C., based National Coalition Against Domestic Violence, "[mlen usually
get one free shot at violating their protection order in most states." Id.
141. See, e.g., supra note 131.
142. 25 A.D.2d 770, 269 N.Y.S.2d 515 (App. Div. 1966).
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estranged wife while in the waiting room of the domestic relations
court." She had held a protective order issued in her favor against her
husband. 1" About a month prior to the incident, the police responded
to a call from the woman, but when presented with the protective order,
they had refused to take further action, saying it was "only a piece of
paper" and "no good."' Upon seeing her husband several weeks later
at a scheduled meeting in the domestic relations court, the woman
expressed her fear of being exposed to him and requested permission to
remain in the office where she was located. 1" The court personnel
denied her request and sent her to the waiting room where some twenty
minutes later her husband shot her. 47 The court held that the existence
of the protective order was sufficient to create a special relationship and
therefore the police owed a special duty of protection to its carrier.' 4
Twenty-three years later, in Merola v. Merola,49 an appellate
division judge reversed the order of a family court judge which had
permitted the respondent-husband to return to the marital residence. An
order from family court granted the petitioner-wife an order of protection
pursuant to Family Court Act § 842 which required the respondent to
refrain from committing any further acts of harassment or disorderly
conduct and from using foul and abusive language."4 However,
notwithstanding its finding of a family offense, the family court permitted
the respondent to return to the marital premises on the condition that he
comply with the terms of the order of protection.' Upon appellate
review of the record, which demonstrated that the respondent had
conducted himself in a bizarre, offensive and frightening manner towards
the petitioner, the court concluded that the family court had erred in
failing to direct the respondent to vacate and stay away from the marital
premises. 5 2 The judge recognized that the respondent had not engaged
in any physical violence against the petitioner, but stated that the
petitioner's well-founded fear of the respondent mandated a directive to




147. Id. at 771, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 518.
148. Id., 269 N.Y.S.2d at 517.
149. 146 A.D.2d 611, 536 N.Y.S.2d 842 (App. Div. 1989).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 611-12, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 843.
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the respondent to vacate and stay away from the marital residence.153
The order of protection was tailored according to the judge's
directive.1
Baker and Merola symbolize an effective judicial response at
different points in the battering relationship. In Baker, the court reached
the only applicable holding possible once the wife had been shot, namely,
holding the police liable for their failure to protect the wife.155 In
Merola, the appellate judge intervened after the family court judge had
failed to provide an appropriate order of protection and before the
husband was allowed to return to the marital premises." Both judicial
responses, although no guarantee of safety for the seriously-injured wife
in Baker and the unharmed wife in Merola, show that judges can be far
from ambivalent towards the abuse of women.
The importance of judges' attitudes and their behavior cannot be
taken lightly. Within their own courtrooms, judges can communicate a
powerful message about the justice system's view of domestic
violence. 57 Although decisions such as Baker and Merola are a hopeful
indication that judicial abstention from the domestic violence realm has
ended, judicial misconceptions about the problem of battered women and
the legal system's appropriate response can still be improved.
VI. COORDINATION
The legal system as an entity has not produced a uniform and
coordinated response to the problem of battered women. This final
section is divided into two parts: (1) a discussion of how the individual
arms of the legal system can coordinate their actions in order to achieve
a more effective response; and (2) why societal beliefs, reflected in the
legal system's response, may be the ultimate barrier against the battering
relationship.
153. Id. at 612, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 843.
154. Id. at 611, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 842.
155. Baker, 25 A.D.2d at 772, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 578.
156. Merola, 146 A.D.2d at 612, 536 N.Y.S.2d at 843.
157. See Note, Recent Developments, supra note 130, at 282. This argument is
explored more fully in SECTION VIA, see infra notes 158-214 and accompanying text,
for a discussion of whether there is an appropriate alternative to mandatory arrest.
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A. The Need To Work Together
Although the least visible, the legislature has enough resources to
initiate a more effective response through the prompting of the other legal
arms. The legislature can guide the police by enacting mandatory arrest
legislation. A police policy of mandatory arrest is the product of strong
domestic violence legislation.158  In support of mandatory arrest
legislation is a Police Foundation study finding that arrest is the most
effective police response to the battering of women.'" The study
compared three forms of police response to domestic violence: arrest,
counseling, and sending the assailant away for a few hours; the conclusion
was that arrest was the most effective response in reducing domestic
violence."W There are other compelling benefits of mandatory arrest
laws. Arrest advances the goal of short-term victim safety and abuser
deterrence. Family violence occurs in an emotionally charged atmosphere
with the threat of physical injury too often becoming the reality.' If
the spouses are not separated and the husband's rage is not given time to
dissipate, the beating may continue after the police leave. This possibility
is increased when an arrest is made or a misdemeanor citation is issued
and the abuser is released from custody immediately. 62 Arrest also
conveys a message to the batterer that his conduct is wrong and that
society and the legal system will hold him accountable for it.1" When
succeeded by similarly strict measures from other legal personnel, arrest
begins a process that tells the batterer that he can either be rewarded for
stopping his actions or punished for continuing them. Incarceration tells
the batterer that he cannot deny responsibility.
Counter-arguments to mandatory arrest laws have pointed to
judicial lecturing of the batterer as a possible solution. 1 One study of
the criminal court response to non-stranger violence found that judges can
deter future violence by issuing warnings or lectures to defendants
concerning the "inappropriateness and seriousness of their violent
158. See Finesmith, supra note 2, at 94.
159. See generally Sherman & Berk, The Minneapolis Domestic Violence
Experiment, POLICE FOUND. REP., Apr. 1989.
160. Id. at 3.
161. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE, FINAL REPORT
105 (1984) [hereinafter AroRNEY GENERAL'S REPORT].
162. Id.
163. Id. at 104-05.
164. See Note, Recent Developments, supra note 130, at 283.
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behavior.""6 Other studies have shown that a stern admonition can help
to persuade a defendant from future violence.'" Some experts have
asserted that since neither party should be blamed for family disputes,
battering can be treated with mediation techniques practiced by the police,
rather than with criminal sanctions. 67 In response to these arguments,
both judicial admonition and police mediation have been attacked as
ineffective.1" "No matter what role the judge assumes, even if he is the
most knowledgeable, perceptive, compassionate and communicative judge
imaginable, probably only temporary relief from violence can be
accomplished by such a lecture before the next case in the day's long
docket."' Furthermore, the goals of mediation -- communication,
reasonable discourse and joint resolution of adverse interests -- work
against the most immediate relief the battered woman desires."T The
goals she seeks are protection from violence, compensation, possession of
her home without the batterer, and security for her children.17' The
empirical data show that the therapeutic (mediation) model for handling
battering is ineffective and that firm law enforcement including
imprisonment is required to deter wife abuse." Because arrest is the
legal system's most effective deterrent to battering, legislative enactment
in that direction is a sensible long-term policy.
Legislatures can also educate judges as to the criminal nature of
woman abuse and the statutory tools available to confront the
165. See B. SMITH, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
NON-STRANGER VIOLENCE: THE CRIMINAL COURT'S RESPONSE 96 (1983).
166. See ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 161, at 36.
167. See Parnas, supra note 82, at 917 (police training on domestic disturbance
emphasizes mediation skills and impartiality in dealing with the parties).
168. See Parnas, Judicial Response to Intra-Family Violence, 54 MINN. L. REV.
585 (1970) [hereinafter Judicial Responsel; Lefcourt, Women, Mediation and Family
Law, 18 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 266, 268 (1984). Mediation may actually perpetuate
battery by protecting the batterer from criminal sanctions; this protection reinforces the
husband's belief in his right to beat his wife and it absolves him of blame for his actions
and insulates him from social stigma. Stallone, Decriminalization of Violence in the
Home: Mediation in Wife Battery Cases, 2 LAw & INEQUALITY: J. THEORY & PRAC.
493, 518 (1984).
169. Judicial Response, supra note 168, at 598-99.
170. See Lefcourt, supra note 168.
171. Id.
172. Id.; see also Sherman & Berk, The Specific Deterrent Effects of Arrest for
Domestic Assault, 49 AM. Soc. REV. 261 (1984).
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problem. 1" As demonstrated by the Pamela Nigro Dunn case,"
judges often fail to take domestic violence seriously, believing that
victim's fears of future harm are unjusified.7 5 Additionally, many
judges are unfamiliar with their respective state Domestic Violence Acts
and may fail to provide adequate remedies because they are
unknowledgeable about pertinent statutes. 76  Legislatively-enacted
training programs can educate judges about the courtroom attitude which
will most effectively convey the legal system's condemnation of battering
as a criminal act.'" A training program can also educate judges as to
new laws on domestic violence which would encourage greater public
compliance. 71 The goals of all training programs should be to
encourage judges to counter batterer's notions that the justice system
quietly allows unpunished violence against women' 79 and to stress the
importance of judge's behavior in ending domestic violence."' °
Legislatures can also act on a more comprehensive scale, affecting
the entire legal system through the enactment of a single legislative act.
Many states, through some form of a domestic violence act, have
attempted to create a coordinated and consistent response to domestic
violence. For example, the Montana State Legislature specifically
addressed the problem by passing a domestic abuse act which defined
173. See Note, Recent Developments, supra note 130, at 277.
174. See supra note 131.
175. See Note, Recent Developments, supra note 130, at 279.
176. Id. at 281.
177. See id. at 283. Judges must be encouraged to examine the messages they may
unwittingly convey during hearings of domestic violence cases. Id. Frequently, the
defendant will try to justify his violent behavior by describing general problems in his
relationship with the victim. Id. Judges sometimes allow defendants to "tell their own
story" in the hope of aiding a reconciliation. Id. This approach condones the
defendant's view that there may be a valid reason for the battering and does not convey
the message that battering is an illegal way of dealing with problems. Id.
178. Id. at 281. "Formalized study can do for the average judge, and for nearly
every judge much that private study cannot do." Leflar, Continuing Education for
Appellate Judges, 15 BUFFALO L.J. 370, 376 (1966).
179. See Note, Recent Developments, supra note 130, at 282. Consider that
although many members of the judiciary were experienced and successful practitioners
before ascending to the bench, it has been recognized that assuming the judicial mantle
does not necessarily convert a trial or office lawyer into a wise, knowing, and effective
judge. See generally Brady, The Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986: A Selective
Critique, 19 LOY. U. Cmi. L.J. 797 (1988).
180. See Note, Recent Developments, supra note 130, at 279.
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domestic abuse as a crime," makes arrest the preferred response to that
crime, 1 2 requires police officers to file a written report when they do
not arrest," requires police officers to provide victims with a notice of
victim's rights,'" and establishes that an alleged abuser's bail must be
personally determined by a judge." The Montana Legislature
responded to findings that police officers usually refuse to arrest the
abuser, that prosecutors refused to prosecute domestic abuse cases, and
that the previous legislature had done nothing to change that inaction.1"
Other examples include Ohio's Domestic Violence Act, which contains a
comprehensive program to enhance the availability of legal relief for
domestic violence victims; 7 the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of
1986;.8 the Idaho Domestic Violence Crime Prevention Act;189 and
the North Carolina Domestic Violence Act.1go
While the legislature can mandate that the police take a tougher
stance towards batterers, it is unlikely that police officers will begin or
continue to arrest without prosecutorial support. 91 It is not feasible to
encourage police to arrest if a batterer will eventually be released to
assault his wife within a few hours." It is well within a prosecutor's
power to ask that a high bail be set for someone who is likely to pose a
danger to the community. By bringing charges themselves, prosecutors
not only remove from the battered woman some of the responsibility of
instigating action against the batterer; they can also decrease the number
of repeat offenders the police will have to arrest. The police, in return,
181. See Note, Montana's New Domestic Abuse Statute, supra note 27 (referring
to MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-206 (1985)); see also N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 821
(McKinney 1975).
182. Note, Montana's New Domestic Abuse Statute, supra note 27, at 404 (referring
to MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-6-401(2)).
183. Id. (referring to MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-6-421).
184. Id. (referring to MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-6-422).
185. Id. (referring to MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-9-302).
186. Id. at 405-06.
187. See Note, Domestic Relations, supra note 27, at 705.
188. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, paras. 2311-1 to 2313-5 (1987). For an analysis of
this act, see Brady, supra note 179, at 798.
189. IDAHO CODE § 39-6301-17 (1988). For an analysis of this act, see Trout,
Domestic Violence Crime Prevention Act, 32 ADVOC. 7(3) (1989).
190. For an analysis of this act, see Duane, North Carolina's Domestic Violence
Act: Preventing Spouse Abuse, 17 N.C. CENT. L.J. 82 (1988).




can make the prosecutor's job easier by providing the latter access to
reports of prior calls for assistance and arrest with reference to a specific
batterer. This will enable repeat offenders to be identified more easily to
prosecutors who in turn will be able to bring more severe charges against
the batterer. Prosecutors can help the police by communicating their
commitment to vigorous enforcement of anti-domestic violence laws.
Such a commitment encourages both the arrest of batterers and sets a
standard for the rest of the legal system.
Prosecutors can also help transform judicial perceptions. They
can educate judges about the nature of the abusive relationship, including
the uselessness of the lecture as a deterrent, and steer judges away from
such false issues as provocation. Because judges look to prosecutors for
information on a variety of issues,
1 including bail and sentencing,1%
judges might defer to the prosecutor's judgment if the later seeks
appropriate punishment for the abusers.
B. Societal Beliefs Find Reflection in
the Legal System
At the core of the legal system's inability to bond and tackle the
problem of woman-battery is the ingrained attitude of society that
approves of the abuse of women.191 Societal acceptance of family
violence has pervaded the legal system and caused it to offer the same
justifications for condoning the battery of women which society has.
When asked to defend this justification, legal personnel proffer a variety
of superficially plausible reasons to explain their inaction." These
reasons, because they are so widely accepted among legislators, police
officers, prosecutors and judges, have developed into major obstacles
193. See Belsky, On Becoming and Being a Prosecutor, 78 Nw. U.L. REV. 1485,
1513 (1984).
194. Id.
195. A significant number of Americans accept and even approve of family
violence, with men more likely than women to condone domestic abuse. See M.
SCHULMAN, A SURVEY OF SPOUSAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN KENTUCKY 47
(1984) (couples were asked what they thought about partners slapping each other around;
over 8% of the men and slightly over 4% of the women thought it was "necessary"; over
15% of the women related it as "good"; it was considered "normal" by 28% of the men
and over 23% of the women).
196. Waits, supra note 12, at 299.
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blocking legal remedies for abused women.''
Just as society has been reluctant to invade the sanctity of the
family, the legal system has deferred to family privacy as a basis for non-
intervention.19 Studies clearly indicate that police have traditionally
been reluctant to interfere in family disputes1" and the rate of
prosecution and conviction in criminal complaints drops strongly when
there is a prior or present relationship between the alleged assailant and
the victim.' °
Another societal belief that has been incorporated into the legal
system is the idea that the cost required for stopping the abuse of women
is better spent elsewhere.201 This argument assumes that the welfare of
battered women and their children is unimportant compared to the time
and safety of legal officials. The fear is that if the law started to take
battering seriously, it would be overwhelmed by abuse cases.' This
response also extends past financial cost to other factors; for example, the
police often view domestic quarrels as high danger, no-win situations in
which the victim is uncooperative and the policeman's efforts are better
spent apprehending "real" criminals.'
All of these justifications can be exposed for precisely what they
are: unjustifiable neglect. Legal doctrines that limit governmental
interference with the family are grounded on reasons that have no
197. Id.
198. Basler, Prior Relations Cited as a Factor in a Felony Case, N.Y. Times, Feb.
24, 1982, at B1, col. 1 (description of a case involving a pregnant woman who was
beaten and then burned with a hot iron by her former boyfriend; the former boyfriend
was arrested on a charge of felony assault but the Manhattan District Attorney's Office
reduced the charge to a misdemeanor).
199. See Pence, supra note 72, at 251-52; Buzawa, Police Officer Response to
Domestic Violence Legislation in Michigan, 10 POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 415, 415-16
(1981) ("police have historically taken the position that it was not their responsibility to
intervene in domestic violence conflicts"); M. SCHULMAN, supra note 195, at 40 (police
failed to respond to 17% of all calls for help from battered women).
200. RULE OF THUMB, supra note 134, at 33.
201. Id. at 13.
202. See Parnas, Police Discretion and Diversion of Incidents of Intra-Family
Violence, 36 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 539, 539-40 (1971) (courts and police wish to
divert domestic violence cases away from the criminal justice system because the system
cannot keep up with the demands imposed by these cases).
203. See RULE OF THUMB, supra note 134, at 13.
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application to the problem of woman battery.z0 The law respects
decisions on intra-family arrangements because society assumes that
family members can reach responsible decisions free of governmental
intrusion.' This rationale must fail because the battering relationship
is so blatantly harmful that no decision can be considered acceptable for
the woman. Another justification offered is that policies favoring family
autonomy may reflect a lack of confidence in governmental wisdom. This
reasoning would allow families to make bad decisions for themselves for
fear that governmental decisions may be worse." This reasoning is
dangerous when battering is chosen as family behavior and the results are
tragic . ' The legal system's rationalization that the cost of stopping
wife abuse is a bad priority and outweighs its benefits is economically and
morally wrong. Ignoring the problem will only compound it for future
generations. Moreover, we cannot accept the sacrifice of victim's lives
as a fair price for the legal system's convenience.
If there is one excuse that has permeated the legal system through
societal belief and has contributed to an uncoordinated response from the
legal system, it is the belief that someone else is better able to deal with
the problem. This argument offers the rationalization that legal
institutions are ill-equipped to deal with complex social and psychological
problems like battering and should thus avoid them."5 This argument
fails to rebut the reality that when the stakes are high enough, and when
the alternatives to legal intervention are inadequate, the legal system does
not hesitate to intercede and resolve the problem.' Although battery
involves difficult and sensitive issues, it is clear that someone must move
against abuse, and that no other social institution has the legal system's
clout to protect victims and to force batterers to face the consequences of
204. Lerman, supra note 27, at 69-70 (family privacy doctrines rest on the
importance we attach to the home as a safe haven; because the home is not a safe place
for domestic violence victims, the policies behind these doctrines argue in favor of
governmental intervention into family violence, not against it).
205. See, e.g., Waits, supra note 12, at 300 n.186 (citing McGuire v. McGuire,
157 Neb. 226, 59 N.W.2d 336 (1953)) (Kathleen Waits points out that the law
traditionally would not interfere with support arrangements in the on-going family).,
206. Id. at 300.
207. Id.
208. See authorities cited in Waits, supra note 12, at 301 n.197.
209. Examples would include child custody and bias-related discrimination. Id.
1990]
180 JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS [Vol. VIII
their transgressions.21
The non-enforcement practice of the legal system with respect to
the abuse of women is a reflection of prevailing societal values and
attitudes regarding public intervention in domestic assault cases."'
Historically, women have been defined in our society as subordinate to
men. As a result, men have been given a disciplinary role in the family,
which has ostensibly legitimized the use of violence against women. 12
Examining the history of the legal system's response to battery may lead
many to believe that the legal system is the institution in our society
which enforces those moral standards we establish for ourselves.
213 If
society condones battering, by action or inaction, the legal system absorbs
this view and perpetuates the violence it is supposed to alleviate.1 4
VII. CONCLUSION
The individual arms of the legal system have attempted to
confront the problem of battered women. Legislatures have provided
tools for the fight.2 5  The police response, once wholly
unsatisfactory, 1 6  has markedly improved.2 7  Prosecutorial
inaction218 has been met with progressive solutions.21 9 Judges have
attempted to eliminate their conformity to domestic violence myths' by
enforcing the law on those who refuse to protect abused women." The
210. Id. at 302. Kathleen Waits would narrow down the "legal system" to
.criminal law" because she sees the criminal law as the primary tool for deterring wife
abuse and other violent behavior due to its ability to label behavior as socially
unacceptable. Id. at 270 n.11.
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battering of women, however, remains a deadly reality. 22  Powerful
social forces which permit and encourage abuse' have found reflection
in the legal system's response to the problem.' Moreover, for every
person, whether legislator, police officer, prosecutor, judge, or citizen
who has been enlightened about the abuse of women, there are countless
who remain ignorant. By taking unequivocal action against battering, the
legal system can eventually make inroads against the social forces that
condone abuse.' The individual arms of the legal system need to
respond in unison and coordinate their response. The legal system as a
whole can curtail the abuse of women.
Matthew Litsky
222. See supra notes 1-11 and accompanying text.
223. See authorities cited in Waits, supra note 12.
224. See supra notes 195-214 and accompanying text.
225. See D. MARTIN, BATTERED WIVES 174-75 (1976). In
argument that "you cannot legislate attitudes":
I disagree; I think that legislation very often
effects changes in public attitudes over time.
The activity preceding the passage of a bill
contributes to the process....
* * * [After] a bill becomes law, the
die-hards have to learn to accept its existence..
When a law is enforced, it
eventually becomes a part of the social fabric, a
given in the daily lives of citizens. Only then
does the collective change in attitudes have a
lasting effect.
17.
response to the

